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Inside Out: In Defense of Form

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SUMMARY: Three case studies show a consistent preoccupation with a similar formal problem within different areas of inquiry. The problem is the relation of inside to outside. The areas are genre criticism, speech act theory, and sovereignty theory. Genre, an external feature of a text, is a topic discussed within Latin poetry. Poets can assert their poetry's power in the world only through poetry. The sovereign, who is subject to the law, also lies outside it in his ability to suspend it. In each case, the power to determine reality and the power to represent it are in competition. The personal voice in this paper responds to Lowell Edmunds' questions about methodology.

THERE IS A CERTAIN STRUCTURE OF THOUGHT that has always appealed to my mind. I think of it as the paradox of the inside/outside relation for short. Although the kind of work I am doing now differs in many ways from what I was doing 15 years ago, I often find that when I am working on what appears to be a new problem, it will suddenly dawn on me that the new material and its new context partake of the structure of the inside/outside relation. It turns out that I am still working on the same thing and that this thing is essentially a formal problem, however much I may be trying to escape the seductions of form.

I present three cases taken from three different projects that exemplify this problem. They show how a text's relation to the world has consistently, and in different ways put pressure on, shifted, and transformed my way of thinking about the inside/outside relation. It is this, the articulation of the relationship between a text and its world or worlds, that I would identify as the overriding critical problem facing us today.

First an aside. One of the questions Lowell Edmunds asked us to address is our methodology. I think of myself as a close reader, which means that in

my writing, whatever theoretical orientations may emerge are subordinated to interpretations of texts or issues rather than the other way around. He asked us to give an example to support our method. The examples I will take us through are exemplary not only for the issues at stake in them but also for the method itself: the working out of a problem is what leads in one or another theoretical direction, although the kinds of problems that attract me generally fall within a range of questions that have some theoretical relation. This is how I went from thinking about genre in Latin poetry to thinking about the structure of sovereignty. The links between topics are largely metonymic, that is, connected by a process of contingent association (Horace and Augustus, for instance, lived in the same period), while the principle of selection is largely metaphoric, that is, each topic is related by the structural similarity of the inside/outside paradox.

Another aside. I could have written a number of other narratives, with other connecting threads, such as the exemplum or presence, but the inside/outside paradox allows me to explore the importance of abstract form, which is a crucial topic for the study of Roman culture.

1. "*LA LOI DU GENRE*"[1]

Given my training in high school and college, where the focus was on close reading in the manner of the New Criticism, it is hardly surprising that I gravitated in graduate school to the problem of genre. Genre criticism promises to give an account of the differences between literature's major forms—and in a subsequent move calls such differentiation into question, but that is another story. The account of differences already reaches outside form taken in itself, because the various forms ostensibly come into being in response to different social contexts. I thrilled to the distinction, according to Greg Nagy and Francis Cairns among others, between living occasion, which was supposed to supply the impetus to the differences in the kinds of Greek poetry, and dead genre, which was supposed to substitute for the loss of the living occasion in Latin poetry.[2] Latin poetry emerged as bookish, artificial, decadent, and self-conscious. I loved this understanding of Latin literature precisely because the folding of genre into the poetry as a topic allowed for the exploration of the inside/outside paradox. We were no longer analyzing forms, we were analyzing talk about forms. Alessandro Barchiesi has expressed this well in his piece called "Rituals in Ink: Horace on the Greek Lyric Tradition."

[1] Title of Derrida.

[2] Lowrie 38 n. 49.

He identifies several features that characterize Augustan poetry, the first two of which are (167):

1. *Thematization and dramatization*: The "folding" of genre, by which I mean that genre as a theme becomes the productive and, at the same time, a problematic condition of those same texts. One might even speak of the "theatralization of genre"; in linguistic jargon, it is now more mentioned than simply used.

2. *A sense of rift and loss*: That is, a sense of breaking away from "moments of truth," and from origins. The idea of genre oscillates between the actual internalized matrix of the new work and a regressive vision of genre as it used to be, or should be.

Let me hold off Barchiesi's third feature, "politicization," for the moment because that will point the way out of the narcissistic pleasure of poetry's talking about itself, and I am not yet ready to leave that behind. The "sense of rift and loss" is a direct consequence of the "thematization" of genre: once poetry talks about genre as a theme, it no longer participates in it in an unmediated way. It has separated itself from being in a genre, because talk about genre does not belong to the genre itself. This is a feature of any kind of poetic self-consciousness, and in *Horace's Narrative Odes* I bring genre together with style, kinds of discourse, traditions and their innovations as topics of poetry's talking about itself that set in motion the inside/outside paradox (37):

> Is the poetry about poetry inside or outside the poetry itself? When Horace proclaims, via an entire repertory of symbols and codes, that his poetry is lyric, is the proclamation itself lyric, or does it lie outside lyric? … Referring to one's self entails stepping outside of oneself; subject and object are the same, split but not divided. It is not a simple question of exteriority; the objective comment occurs within.

These are the sorts of ideas Derrida pursues in his famous article "La loi du genre," and they obey the logic of what he calls the "fold," exteriority that has been brought within like a pocket or orifice. This is the most arid manifestation of the inside/outside problem, and this approach has exposed Latinists and deconstructionists alike to the dread accusation of formalism—or at least the approach would be arid if it were not for an important feature of Latin literature that is implicated in poetic self-consciousness, but leads to a new level of externality, namely, Barchiesi's third category (167):

3. *Politicization*: Generic divisions and oppositions take on specific political and social values, for example, discussions of epic versus elegy in Roman poetry imply discussions of "what to do with the Principate in literature";

> the limits of the bucolic genre involve the limits between private and political; small forms versus large forms; popular versus elitist ethos, and so on.

Horace defines lyric among other genres in the *Ars poetica* according to subject matter (83–87):

> Musa dedit fidibus diuos puerosque deorum
> et pugilem uictorem et equum certamine primum
> et iuuenum curas et libera uina referre.
> descriptas seruare uices operumque colores
> cur ego si nequeo ignoroque poeta salutor?
>
> The Muse gave it to the lyre to relate (*referre*) the gods, and the sons of gods, and the victorious boxer, and the horse first in the race, and the cares of youths and plentiful wine. Why am I greeted as a poet if I am unable and don't know how to preserve the laid down turns and colors of works?

If Augustus is a god, future god, or at least the son of a god, Horace's own definition of lyric as handed down from the Greeks would suggest that his task as a lyrist is, or rather was, to relate something about him, and this is what Horace spends so much energy in *Odes* 1–3 refusing to do. The kind of solution to this problem I suggest in *Horace's Narrative Odes* is that the form of lyric discourse and the fragmentation of the narratives told in the first collection of *Odes* respond to the political difficulty of telling the story of recent Roman history, namely, civil war. The painfulness of the political reality results in an avoidance of overt storytelling that accords well with the modes of speech presentation in lyric. If the Greek model of lyric Horace outlines in the *Ars* would suggest that he relate the victory of Augustus, we would expect a praise poem containing *res gestae*; specifically, a celebration narrating the victory at the battle of Actium. Instead, civil war fragments the narrative so that when we do find a poem on Actium, the protagonist shifts from Octavian to Cleopatra; rather than his victory, we are presented with her defeat. These thematic displacements correspond to a displacement in form. Rather than *relate* the national myth, Horace enacts it. I argue that the dichotomies informing the Cleopatra Ode figure civil war rather than telling it. This sort of move is made for epic by David Quint in *Epic and Empire*, and I transfer the argument to lyric.

The usefulness of this argument in relation to the inside/outside paradox is that poetry ends up not just talking about whatever it talks about—itself, wine, women, and Caesar—but doing something. It presents to the world a representation of the world that actively engages in shaping the world. The problem with this sort of argument is that it leads us to another configura-

tion of the inside/outside paradox that I call by another nickname, and this is section 2: the pragmatics of literature.

2. THE PRAGMATICS OF LITERATURE

Can literature actually do things in the world, or does it just talk about it from the outside? If it can, what sorts of things does it do? I am currently writing a book on the relation of performance to writing in poetic and political self-representation in the Augustan age. What started as an analysis of genre and tradition in the choices of poets to represent themselves as predominantly either singing or writing, quickly turned into a consideration of the poets' thoughts about poetry's ability to effect things in the world. Is poetry secluded from interaction through the absence associated with writing, or does it participate in events through the presence associated with song? When Vergil says *cano* we do not generally suppose he literally sings.[3] The vocabulary of song rather inscribes him into the epic genre, which since Homer presents itself as song—the Muse's rather than the poet's, but song nevertheless. This is an account of his choice according to the considerations outlined in my first section, namely, genre. When Helenus advises Aeneas to make the Sibyl sing instead of writing down her prophecy, however, we run up against basic issues of communicability. The prophecies she writes on leaves blow away when people consult them, and are ineffective (*Aen.* 3.443–52). For her utterance to be effective it must be sung, that is, inspired by god, performed and witnessed in the same moment.

[3] Thomas Habinek in this volume pursues the idea that the *Aeneid* was performed. My point has less to do with historical actualities than with the grammatological status of the text. Even if the *Aeneid* was performed to musical accompaniment, as happened with the mime performances of the *Eclogues* (*Vita donatiana* 26; *Vita Donati aucti* 41; *Vita philargyriana* 1; see Brugnoli and Stok 181, 1–3), there would still be a disparity between the singing voice and the voice of the speaker. The *Lives* also record stories of Vergil reciting to Augustus (see Horsfall 19, though he is sceptical about the stories' authenticity, as Pliny the Younger says that he does not know whether Vergil, Nepos, Accius, or Ennius recited). If Vergil did recite, there would be a disparity between the kind of vocalization mentioned and that enacted. What is depicted in the text cannot consistently line up exactly with its medium of reception, partly because the ability of different media to transmit the text and the text's persistence over time always imposes itself, even if at a particular moment it were to happen that the internal representation would line up with the external medium. So, even if Vergil himself sang, we would still be aware that the text could be read or repeated at another moment, such that *cano* would have a life independent of its author.

Again, this is an instance of a poet talking about poetic effectiveness from within a poem. The question of whether a poem can actually do something outside itself has been subject to debate. In the field of Latin poetry, Lowell Edmunds and Mario Citroni have staked out different positions about speech act theory and literature.[4] J. L. Austin's seminal book, *How To Do Things with Words*, states in a nutshell the issue: what sorts of things do words do? It turns out that Austin's list of speech acts corresponds closely with the lyric speech situations enumerated by Richard Heinze in "Die horazische Ode" (1923 in 1972: 148–64): exhort, invite, promise, reproach, recommend, and the like. To simplify greatly, Citroni sees literature as having the possibility of conveying these meanings into the world, while Edmunds does not. Writing divorces a poem from an organic context of utterance such that, as Heinze puts it, these speech situations are fictions.[5] As representations, they are inert.

What is being discussed here is what Austin calls an utterance's illocutionary force. This is, for instance, the force of recommendation: "I recommend the Merlot." It is a feature internal to the utterance and it is independent of its perlocutionary effect, such as your dining companion's accepting the recommendation. Illocutionary force can run aground of such things as fiction; Austin excludes illocutionary seriousness from literature. He famously says, "I must not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem." It can also run aground of metaphor. When Horace invites Maecenas to drink Sabinum in *Odes* 1.20, the wine is commonly taken as a metaphor for poetry; Maecenas does not expect to turn up to dinner some evening, but rather expects to read the poem.

With Austin's category of perlocutionary effect, we move outside the world of intentions to an utterance's actual reception in the world. Part of the problem is that your interlocutor may recognize your recommendation of the Merlot and accept it as such, so that, in Austin's terms, the utterance is felicitous as a recommendation, but still choose the Pinot Noir, or the Falernian. Ovid, who explores the issue of poetry's effectiveness in *Tristia* 2, laments that his poetry has had unintended effects (5–8).

[4] Edmunds in his ch. 5 stages his disagreement with Citroni as a dialogue.

[5] Jonathan Culler is currently writing a book on lyric in which he starts with sections on ancient lyric. He argues, against Heinze, that lyric speech situations are not fictitious recreations of real-life speech situations. But, rather than take things in the direction that much classical scholarship does, namely, to set the speech situations into contexts that activate them pragmatically, he recognizes the grammatological quality of ancient lyric since the Greeks. Rather than representing fictitious versions of real-life speech situations, lyric offers poetic speech situations that have their own logic. I thank him for sharing drafts of his chapter on Greek and Latin lyric in advance of publication.

carmina fecerunt, ut me cognoscere uellet
omine non fausto femina uirque meo:
carmina fecerunt, ut me moresque notaret
iam demi iussa Caesar ab Arte meos.

Poetry brought it about that woman and man wish to know me, at the price of a bad omen; poetry brought it about that Caesar marked me and my morals by my *Ars*, which he has ordered to be removed.

The repeated substantive clauses of result insist that poetry does indeed have effects in the world, but that these lie outside the poet's control. On no account could the *Ars* be interpreted to have the illocutionary force of inviting Augustus to send Ovid into exile. What Ovid argues in *Tristia* 2, however, is that the *Ars* did not have the illocutionary force of advising people to commit adultery either, or that, even if it did, the responsibility for committing adultery lies squarely on the shoulders of the lovers, not the poet. *Tristia* 2 offers an extended meditation on the inside/outside paradox on many levels. What is so strange is that Augustus has chosen to take the *Ars* seriously, as if Ovid were not, in Austin's words, "writing a poem." Ovid's self-defense instantiates the paradox: if the *Ars* is in fact ineffective at persuading people to commit adultery, if it is "mere poetry," then *Tristia* 2 as poetry will also be ineffective and fail to persuade Augustus to alleviate Ovid's sentence. However, even if the *Ars* turns out to be effective, as Augustus in *Tristia* 2 presumably supposes it, *Tristia* 2 will still be ineffective, as Augustus will have been right to condemn the poet.

Ovid, however, does not stop his analysis of this problem at poetry. In *Tristia* 2 the law rivals poetry as a mode of discourse. What Augustus sets forth as an edict has immediate and binding force. From the point of view of speech act theory, Ovid's choice of *edictum* (135) as Augustus' medium of expression is telling. His "speaking out" is automatically effective; it has the force of law. Ovid, however, ultimately gets the upper hand by pointing out that, however much Augustus may control events in the world, the handing down of representations to posterity remains in the hands of the poets. Again and again, the argument flips over: first the *Ars* is and then is not effective; then poetry yields to the law as a discourse with power in the world; finally poetry prevails in its ability to confer immortality once poet and emperor alike pass away.

This entire argument, however, takes place within the realm of poetry. The pressure on Ovid to think in this way is presented as a catastrophic external event: the emperor's decision to exile him. The nine books of exile poetry show that it really was ineffective in bringing about a change of sentence. The dispute over whether Ovid really did go into exile is, I think, a response to Ovid's

meditation on the relation of poetry's inside to the world's outside. Ovid shows poetry's inability to achieve effects in the world and scholars respond by suggesting an even greater detachment: the whole narrative is entirely fictitious.

My interest in pragmatics and the power of the emperor's speech has led me to think about Augustus' definition of his power as *auctoritas* in the *Res gestae*. At this point, I have moved outside literature, but not outside the representing media. The question that again bothers me is the use/mention problem. If *auctoritas* is a power that brings things into being by its exercise, as we find in the definition of Benveniste,[6] why in this inscription does it need to be mentioned above and beyond its use? And if we take a step backward from representation to the thing itself, the difficulty in conceptualizing *auctoritas* as a political power has entirely to do with the inside/outside problem. First of all, *auctoritas* is often defined in contrast to *potestas*, the former residing outside the law, the latter within. Augustus himself contrasts the terms (*Res gestae* 34.3):

> Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt.
>
> After that time I excelled all in authority, however I had no more official power than the others who were my colleagues in each magistracy.

The official power is the legal power of each magistracy and is attached to it; the authority surpasses these limits. But *auctoritas* is further implicated in the inside/outside problem. Scholars in Classics from Richard Heinze to Karl Galinsky will tell you that *auctoritas* is a power the Romans conceived of as emanating from the individual—i.e., inside out—while Pierre Bourdieu will tell you that it is conferred on a leader by his followers—i.e., outside in.[7] Now clearly you need both and the two feed on each other. People only confer this sort of power on people with certain qualities (charisma), and the qualities can only find a field of operation once they are recognized.

I would argue for something similar for *auctoritas*' use and its mention. *Auctoritas*, which operates in the sphere of use, also needs representation, that

[6] "Toute parole prononcée avec l'*autorité* détermine un changement dans le monde, crée quelque chose; cette qualité mystérieuse, c'est ce que *augeo* exprime, le pouvoir qui fait surgir les plantes, qui donne existence à une loi" (2.150).

[7] Heinze 43–58; Galinsky 12: "*Auctoritas* is or denotes a quality that is inherent in and emanates from an individual"; Bourdieu 192: "Symbolic power is a power which the person submitting to *grants* to the person who exercises it, a credit with which he credits him, a *fides*, an *auctoritas*, with which he entrusts him by placing his trust in him. It is a power which exists because the person who submits to it believes that it exists."

is, it needs to be mentioned, because cultural representation is not merely an inert reporting of external realities, but is an active sphere of engagement. *Auctoritas* thrives on being actualized, and this can happen through both its exercise and its representation. Denis Feeney once remarked to me, "Every intervention reconfigures the matrix."[8] I want to emphasize that both use and mention are interventions. The representation of *auctoritas* keeps it performatively in play from one instance of use to another, and has the further advantage, as in the inscription, of recording it for posterity after the death of its possessor. But it is important to recognize the dynamism involved: the much noted tendency of *auctoritas*, which derives from *augeo*, to grow has to do with its reconfiguration, in this case reinforcement, every time it is used or mentioned.

Let me pause here to note that we, or I, have come a long way from the question of genre with which I began—from literature's talking about itself, to Augustus' talking about himself—but that we are still squarely within the question of "talking about," that is, the inside/outside dynamic of self-definition. Can we get out of this dynamic? Perhaps, but although my next example does not have to do with "talking about," it is nevertheless another instance of the inside/outside problematic.

3. SOVEREIGNTY

A lot of intellectual development happens by chance; the timing of your exposure to an idea is critically important. A few years ago a colleague of mine in the English department at NYU, Anselm Haverkamp, gave me a book called *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, by the Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben. Since Haverkamp has a knack for giving people the right book at the right time, the new direction my thoughts have taken has not come about entirely fortuitously. We belong to an intellectual community that shares not only issues but also habits of thought. Nevertheless, sometimes a book can suddenly make a difference in your thinking in unexpected ways. What this book opened up for me is a way of thinking about Roman politics, and particularly the structure of sovereignty, that makes sense according to my intellectual predispositions, that is, according to the logic of the inside/outside paradox. If I had read this book while preoccupied with genre, however, it would not have been as useful to me as it has been, since my exposure to it came when I was thinking about *auctoritas* as a performative kind of political power that operates beyond the sphere of the law.

[8] Cf. also DeLillo 465: "When you alter a single minor component, the system adapts at once."

Agamben's starting point for analyzing sovereign power is Carl Schmitt's definition of the sovereign as "he who decides on the state of exception." This is the first sentence of Schmitt's *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Schmitt is largely responsible for articulating fascist political theory, and his *Politische Theologie* first came out in 1922, with a revised edition in 1934. By "state of exception" he means the suspension of the law in a state of emergency. The sovereign is the one to declare such things as martial law. Since Roman history in the late Republic leading up to Augustus' principate could be described as a sequence of different kinds of states of exception with different degrees of legality (dictatorships, *senatus consulta ultima*, the triumvirates, the principate itself), it occurred to me—on the metaphorical principle of comparison according to similarity—that fascist political theory might be useful for understanding the collapse of the Roman Republic.

Let me take a step backward to show what kind of material I had already grouped together such that understanding the sovereign as he who decides on the state of exception suddenly made sense. When I was working on Cleopatra as a figure for civil war, the word that summed up her paradoxical status was *monstrum* (Lowrie 151–55). Horace calls her *fatale monstrum* (*C.* 1.37.2); Victor Pöschl calls attention (91) to the fact that Cicero calls Catiline *monstrum*, and Livy also calls Spurius Maelius by the same word. What unites Catiline and Maelius is that they are depicted as aspiring to *regnum*, that is, to become sovereign, and they consequently become internal enemies. The internal enemy is a contradiction because you want your enemy to be outside the city walls. In the second Catilinarian oration Cicero reassures the people that the internal enemy has been expelled, that is, pushed out (2.1):

> Nulla iam pernicies a monstro illo atque prodigio moenibus ipsis intra moenia comparabitur.
>
> Now no harm from that freak will be devised against the very walls, within the walls.

Cleopatra is reassuring as a figure for civil war, because, although Horace represents her as preparing ruin for the Capitoline, i.e., aspiring to *regnum*, she is an external enemy who masks the internal nature of the war.

The methods for dealing with Maelius and Catiline, the dictatorship and the *senatus consultum ultimum* respectively, respond to the internal/external paradox of the enemy found within by suspending the law, an act that makes evident the inside/outside paradox in the structure of sovereignty itself. The structure of the crisis has a similar shape to that of the solution. What do I

mean? Agamben analyzes Schmitt on the relation of the sovereign to the state of exception thus (15):

> The paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact [that] the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order. If the sovereign is truly the one to whom the juridical order grants the power of proclaiming a state of exception and, therefore, of suspending the order's own validity, then "the sovereign stands outside the juridical order and, nevertheless, belongs to it, since it is up to him to decide if the constitution is to be suspended *in toto*" (Schmitt, *Politische Theologie,* p. 13). The specification that the sovereign is "*at the same time* outside and inside the juridical order" (emphasis added) is not insignificant: the sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law.

Understanding sovereignty in this way makes sense of two things that are puzzling about the transition from Republic to Empire under Augustus. The first is how sovereignty passed from the SPQR to an individual. During a state of exception, the Senate suspends the law so that the dictator or consuls in the *senatus consultum ultimum* or the triumvirs may operate freely to safeguard the state. The question is then how to return to normalcy, to reinstate the law once the crisis is over. Who declares the crisis over? I would argue that Augustus' famous sentence in the *Res gestae* describing his so-called restoration of the Republic demonstrates that sovereignty had actually passed from the SPQR to him: he is the one who has the power to declare the state of exception over. What is unstated is that the one who can call an end to the suspension of the law retains the power to suspend it at will, and therefore, according to Schmitt's definition, remains sovereign. Augustus says (*Res gestae* 34.1):

> In consulatu sexto et septimo, postquam bella ciuilia exstinxeram, per consensum uniuersorum potitus rerum omnium, rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli.
>
> In my sixth and seventh consulships, after I had extinguished the civil wars, having acquired all things through the consensus of all, I transferred the state from my power [*potestas*] into the governance of the SPQR.

The second puzzling thing is how *auctoritas* operates as a sovereign power in relation to *potestas.* Augustus' statement contrasting these two powers depicts his power as operating outside the law, exactly in the position of the sovereign as defined by Schmitt. The Augustan principate is a permanent state of exception in that the forms of the law continue to operate under the shadow of the sovereign. Sovereignty has shifted from the Senate, which was previ-

ously the political body to decide on the state of exception, to the *princeps*, whose very title as first among equals expresses the paradox.[9] He is both within and without the constitution.

Agamben finishes the paragraph quoted above with a double statement of the inside/outside paradox (15):

> This means that the paradox can also be formulated this way: "the law is outside itself," or: "I, the sovereign, who am outside the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law [*che non c'è un fuori legge*]."

Agamben's phrase, *non c'è un fuori legge*, clearly recalls Derrida's famous dictum, *il n'y a pas d'hors-texte*. The movement from text to law as the domain in question retains the structure of the inside/outside relation. In shifting from text to law, however, does Agamben suggest that there is an *hors-texte*, namely, the law? I don't think so. For Derrida's formulation to work, "text" must be taken metaphorically. It does not mean merely that all of our empirical evidence derives from texts. Archaeological remains for the past and lived experience for the contemporary world are not literally texts. For material and experiential evidence to make sense, however, it must already have been brought into systems of representation, which we can call by metaphor texts. The law is one such system of representation. Although in this domain I am no longer talking about the use/mention problem that is a consistent aspect of all of my work on Latin literature, I have hardly escaped the inside/outside paradox in thinking about Roman culture.

ENDING

Consistently throughout my work, the exterior world, largely conceived of as the political, has put pressure on my narrower formulations of the inside/outside distinction as I have been working with it in literature. We could think of this as the outside opening up the closed world of the inside. But I want to stand back and note that from the starting point—literature talking about its own genre—to where I have ended up—thinking about the structure of sovereignty—there has never not been either an inside or an outside. The dynamic of this relation has been a shared constant, albeit one that has taken many forms.

I think the charge of formalism often leveled against people who do the kind of work I do is not really meant to critique the analysis of the forms that

[9] Carratelli 37: "Pari agli altri Romani in quanto *ciuis* e magistrato, Augusto è fuori della *respublica* in quanto *princeps* per una singolare *auctoritas*, ch'è solennemente riconosciuta inattinta ed inattingibile da altri."

literature or culture take, but is rather a code word for the analysis of literature or other cultural artefacts as within a self-contained aesthetic world, set apart from considerations of politics, social context, history, and the like. Given the turn in our field away from the New Criticism back toward the historicization that was our field's prior assumption of what our work is, I would like us to keep in mind that politics, social context, history, and the like do not take place somehow outside form. For me, a consistent preoccupation with the inside/outside paradox has led to an opening from literature's interiority toward the world. I want to insist, however, that both terms are always in operation and that the people who work in the history, politics, and sociology of Rome would do well to remember that the materials they are handling, whether histories, inscriptions, or physical remains, all participate in a system of cultural representation that informs them, by which I mean that it gives them form. This kind of formalism is dynamic, interactive, and by no means self-enclosed.

Let me end with a coda: who you have as colleagues and what institutions you belong to are formative for intellectual development. During the past decade and longer, I have watched a concomitant development in the work of my colleague Michael Peachin, who is a Roman Imperial historian. Although his aim is to discover the social realities in operation in the Roman Empire, he has increasingly become interested in the media of representation that are the vehicles for these realities. His interest in imperial administration has led him to Roman writing about administration, specifically, to Frontinus' *De aquis*. He has now produced a monograph on this text that argues that it is not in fact much use as a handbook on administering the aqueducts, that it is a document whose primary purpose is the self-fashioning of its author, and that its representational value exceeds its practical usefulness. He has produced what I would call a literary study of this text. Although, in terms of the inside/outside dichotomy, I would position my own perspective as on the inside looking out, and his on the outside looking in, over the course of the last decade, we have, I think, come closer together, so that we now not only have much more to say to one another than we used to, but can usefully critique one another's work. This is a good thing.

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